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CRIMINOLOGY AS A FORCE FOR HUMAN TOLERANCE
Harold E. Pepinsky
Indiana University, Bloomington

ABSTRACT
Criminology
traditionally
has been the
study of twin forms of intolerance--crime and
punishment.
Punishment
can only
increase
crime. Criminology ought to become a study
of
how to alleviate crime and punishment
by
engineering tolerance of greater varieties of
human behavior, where
"social control" takes
on positive connations.
A
framework
is
outlined for making criminology a force for
human tolerance.

When national spirits are
low as now in my
country,
crime is fearsome and war or
its
onset palpable.
Spirits become low as
it
becomes apparent that national appetites are
unsatisfied. Within a
society, the problems
may range from children dying of hunger to
chieftains ordering death
and destruction
because palace vaults remain unfilled. While
it
is tempting to point fingers at villains
to punish for national disspirit,
and while
the hungry children deserve more
sympathy
than chieftains whose thirst
for
power
is
unquenchable, the only cure
for a national
disease like ours is one that satisfies human
appetites throughout society.
Unless paths
to power can be so directed that wealth moves
toward the poor and the food moves to hungry
children,
even
the chieftains
risk
a
premature violent end.
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Crime and punishment, then, are among many
symptoms of a national meanness of spirit--of
a disease of the central nervous system of a
people that drives the
people to victimize
one another in the name of
survival of the
body politic.
Among our people today is a group who call
themselves criminologists. Criminologists are
those whose livelihood rests on the promise
they offer of contributing to a prescription
to relieve
the symptoms
of
crime
and
punishment.
The position of
criminologist
during national disspirit is both established
and marginal.
It is solid because people are
willing to pay a lot to be able to victimize
(or punish)
offenders before the offenders
victimize them.
It is vulnerable because
those at the top of the political order feel
so vulnerable
to
collapse of
the
order
itself.
Criminologists whose work implies
prescribing political reordering by extension
question rulers' prerogatives, and question
imprisonment and execution of dissolute poor
young men.
On the
surface, they side with
devils
against national heroes and saviors.
If not
allied with
the devil, if on the
political side of the angels, the work of the
criminologists must confirm the possibility
that punishing poor young
men can be a just
and
effective
cure
for
crime.
This
constraint has the same
effect as
limiting
medicine
to
treating hemophilia to
the
science of
using bandaids
for treatment.
When patients keep dying
because internal
bleeding
is
ignored,
suspicion
can be
expected to rise that the doctors do not know
what they are doing.
Promising young doctors
stand to be cast as buffoons or quacks before
their
careers
end.
Some
of
these
criminologists rise to
wealth and prominence
for a period. During this period, they may
gain the sanctuary of sinecures at prominent
institutions. But people soon stop expecting
to
learn anything new from them about crime
or its control.
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While
few
criminologist
understand our
marginality, all of us soon feel it.
Whether
we side with
the
devil or doom ourselves to
ineffectuality,
we
are
driven
to
form
alliances against the form of marginality we
encounter.
Often,
our safest
targets turn
out
to
be
other
criminologists.
Our
alliances
take
the
form
of
declared
allegiance to schools of
criminology. The
banners of these alliances carry many
names,
from the general
to
the esoteric, from the
impersonal to the personal:
such names as
"science, ..
empirical,'
".critical,"
"ethnomethodological,"
"Marxist,"
and
"humanist."
Battles
fought
under
these
banners are
largely a waste of
lives of
criminologists, who apart from secret
signs
and rituals among members have
little sense
of what
about
crime they
are fighting to
establish or vanquish. On
the other hand,
generally subconsciously,
school
members
share basic religious assumptions about how
crime can be understood
and treated,
about
the origins of
sin
and redemption.
Among
those who assume that conformity to political
authority
is both natural
and necessary,
sinners are those who
depart from reason and
virtue, and redemption lies in supporting the
forces of
law and order.
As
Weber
(1958,
originally 1904-5) describes it, Calvinism is
the purest
expression
of
this religious
premise.
Offenders are born to be damned and
those
in a
state
of
grace are born
to
maintain
discipline
among
the
damned.
Discipline may
range
from
lobotomies to
sterilization to incarceration to
education
to positive peer pressure. At any rate, this
kind of criminologist
is called
to help us
understand how to do
unto offenders before
they do unto us.
Those who
call
themselves
humanists have
rejected religions that absolve some of
the
sins of others. As a corollary, victims and
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their
allies
cannot
be redeemed
without
redeeming offenders. This religion is called
"humanism" because it
acknowledges no higher
purpose to the life of each
of
us than
to
improve
the lot
of
the
meanest,
least
successful
people among us.
Each of us who
lives among badness shares responsibility for
failure to give wrongdoers enough power to do
good and justice to others.
In a
nutshell,
our redemption lies
in giving
killers and
thieves power
to profit
more from saving
lives
and
sharing
wealth.
Means
to
redemption must be
just and
beneficial
in
themselves, since humanists reject knowledge
that destructive or
hurtful
means can be
revealed
to have served good ends in some
future day of judgment.
Human beings can do
no better
than to pass judgment on their own
actions here
and now, and to
presume that
another's
offenses represent a failure of
one's own
social imagination
in
practice.
Ultimately, sin
in others is a mark of one's
own social inadequacy, and
deserves to be
dealt with as such.
So it
is
that humanist
criminologists
presume their
choice of calling to lie in
their own hands.
No practical
reality of
earning a
livelihood can
justify
to
a
humanist
overlooking
an
immediate
responsibility to address how to reduce crime
by changing the political
order shared by
offenders and victims.
It
is
axiomatic to
the humanist that crime is caused by a
political
disease
that infects the entire
society and everyone
in
it.
Crime
is
presumed somehow to
be caused by a tacit
agreement of a society's members
to reward
sin rather than redemption by good works.
Humanists,
therefore,
characteristically
engage in critical analyses of social
reward
and property structures.
They
assume that
crime occurs because virtue does not pay big
enough dividends, and
ask how
pay scales
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might
be adjusted to reward virtue, so that
the
rich get richer faster the more quickly
to catch up with
they arrange for the poor
them, in
sum as rich and poor
redeem
one
another.
Humanists presume
that a
gap
between rich and poor impoverishes most
the
spirit of the rich--that
the
appetite for
redemption takes precedence over all others,
so that
the appetite
of
those who rise
highest above others in power is the appetite
for power that is least sated.
As compassion
in
action,
the
redemption
of
the
criminologist that entails improvement of the
material
lot of
the
poor
also
entails
improvement of the spiritual and impoverished
intellectual lot of the rich.
This article falls
within
the humanist
tradition.
It addresses the
issue of what
kind of impoverishment of holders of economic
power impoverishes
those denied
economic
power, and in the process exacerbates crime
and punishment.
Crime and punishment to this
humanist criminologist are what law and order
are to a Calvinist criminologist:
I assume
you cannot have
more of
one without having
more of
the
other.
Punishment
is
an
inextricable part of the forces that produce
crime, and the solution must somehow entail a
new system of
rewards.
The question
that
confronts me
as a
humanist
criminologist
boils down to this:
How can people be freed
from having
to engage in
the business of
crime and punishment?

THEORY AND PRACTICE
This article is unabashedly
theoretical.
It has become commonplace to figure that
theory
is by
definition
impractical
and
unempirical.
Nothing could be further
from
the truth.
In
any science, a theory
is
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the mistakes
explaining
simply a way of
doing an
is,
(that
experienced
have
people
empirical analysis) that implies odds-on bets
as to how to avoid similar mistakes in future
practical).
being
(that is,
experiments
is
to the theory derived here, it
According
to invest in
impracticality
the height of
in
the hope that
and prisons
more police
implicit
yet,
And
crime will be conquered.
just makes
punishment
in the finding that
a
of
possibility
the
crime worse is
reducing crime
success at
prescription for
walk.
to
safe
streets
making our
and
of
forms
new
to the theory,
According
in American enterprise
government investment
can be hypothesized to free us from crime.
In recognition that being practical requires
a theory of how to achieve success, I cannot
let facts about
as I write rest content to
crime and punishment speak for themselves.

FREEDOM THROUGH SOCIAL CONTROL

One should engineer for variety.
-- Les Wilkins, 1975
We study social control.
-- Vic Streib, 1977
When Les Wilkins made his assertion in a
law and
issues of
class on philosophical
I argued that he
social control we taught,
When Vic Streib
was contradicting himself.
made his assertion (see Streib, 1977) during
how to rename our
faculty discussions of
having agreed
(almost everyone
Department
I
"Forensic Studies" needed changing),
that
learned
since
have
I
vehemently.
dissented
counts. I credit
both
on
that I was wrong
Les and Vic--both trained as engineers--with
forcing a major insight on me.
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I am a criminologist who wants to learn how
crime,
from
freer
society
to make my
I am
inclined
violence, predation and fear.
toward seeking ways to free us from crime by
giving citizens greater
liberty to control
their
own destinies. Engineer and
social
control
connote restriction
of
personal
liberty,
and
I
have
therefore
been
predisposed
to resist them.
But
wait.
Perhaps Les and Vic
have a point.
Perhaps
there are organized ways to expand personal
liberty,
and
perhaps
this
kind
of
organization
offers paths to crime control.
If so, the business of the criminologist who
seeks to free people, as from crime, may well
be to design and test plans for engineering
social
control.
Social control can
connote
shared control
of
personal
destiny; social
control can bestow power on citizens and set
them free.
In this article, I hope to
show how to
distinguish repressive social control
from
liberating social control.
I shall
try to
show that
criminology has largely been a
science of
repressive social
control,
but
that it need not
remain so.
Indeed, if our
knowledge of
crime
is to help us achieve
greater freedom from crime, our science will
have to be one of liberating social control.
Ours will have to
become a
force for human
tolerance.
CONSTRAINING METHOD TO FREE SUBSTANCE

We must learn to accommodate variety.
-- Les Wilkins, n.d.
Les Wilkins's starting point for analyzing
crime
and criminal justice is
information
theory (as in Wilkins, 1974). It is a useful
starting point to put ideas ahead of material
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conoitions.

As Les also argues,
it
is
useless to ask whether
a model is "true" or
"real." The issue ought instead to be whether
a model "works," whether application of
the
model helps us to do things we otherwise
could
not
conceive or
evaluate.
Granted,
conditions--as
reflected
in the
material
class structure--must
be
changed
before
Americans can become freer of crime. Granted
that material circumstances shape much of our
thinking.
Still,
as Marx for
instance
recognized in his early writing,
if
people
are to break free of
material
circumstance
and change their social world,
someone must
first break free of material
constraints on
thinking enough to conceive a critique of the
present and a plan for
the
future.
If
we
criminologists, especially those of
us who
enjoy the relative freedom of tenured faculty
status,
cannot
break
free
to
think
independently of
material circumstance, we
might as well give up on having others break
through
to something
like a
true
class
consciousness.
Material
conditions are no
excuse for us to fail to try thinking freely,
independently,
radically.
This
is
the
underlying premise of
an information systems
model
that challenges us to think about how
variety can
be
accommodated.
The model
implies that we must
first conceive how to
think
less unjustly, more tolerantly, to
generate hypotheses about what changes from
present material
circumstance might improve,
or at other
times or
places have improved,
our social lot.
Wilkins
(1964)
has
most
thoroughly
described his model
as one of
"deviance
amplification."
Whatever
norms of behavior,
appearance or status members
of a
society
impose, whatever system or model we impose to
describe
or
prescribe
behavior,
some
behavior, appearances or
statuses will lie
outside
the system.
Any definition
of
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conformity
implies
the
existence
of
deviance--of inexplicable departures from the
can account
information
norm.
No model of
for all cases. We are then
left with what
Les Wilkins portrays as a crucial choice. We
can reject or
ignore
or try to suppress the
from it
and
deviance,
or
we can
learn
incorporate what we have learned into a new
model.
As he stresses, this is not merely an
academic
issue;
it has profound
practical
implications.
He cites auto theft as an example. We
invent cars, and create registration systems
to maintain an order
of car ownership, hence
of car usage.
Lo and behold, no matter how
hard we try
to perfect
the system, some
people use or steal
cars without the owners'
permission. The more resources we
put into
the creation of cars and car ownership, the
more defiance of
norms of
ownership
we
encounter.
In
fact,
auto theft
rises
in
direct proportion to the number
of cars we
put on the roads. We have two options as
to
how to respond to this deviance.
We can persist in using our model.
We can
persist in the belief that the more force and
resources
we
put
into
perfecting
and
protecting a
system of
owner registration,
the more
conformity
will
prevail
over
deviance.
Or we can presume that
the rise of
auto
theft throws the model
of ownership
and
registration into question. We can recognize
that
expanded
auto
registration
and
enforcement in fact creates auto theft.
We
can recognize that the more determined
our
efforts to regulate car usage, the greater
the variety of
arrangements we create to
confound our system. For instance, when
we
succeed in stamping
the serial
number of a
car
indelibly on the engine block and body,
and
ensure that the police will
check the
number
before
anyone
can
take
out
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registration, we create chop
shops to take
parts off
the
engine block
and
body, and
encourage the growth of
a
market in stolen
parts.
This drives up the overall price of
transferring
stolen cars or
parts,
and
requires that
more conspirators--including
insurance
agents--be
corrupted
into
deviance. Auto theft--the deviance--expands
to
confound our
model of
control
of
car
ownership.
The
better option, then, is to change our
model--our definition--of
the problem of
controlling access to transport.
We might,
for example, project that
the more readily
and
cheaply
available public
transport
became, the less people would care to invest
in private autos, and
the fewer cases of
stolen autos we would encounter.
Notice that
when the model changes, not only our means of
addressing the problem changes, but so does
our very definition of
the problem (from car
usage to transport).
Our new model
proposes
to explain
not only what the
former
model
proposed to explain (orderly auto usage), but
the deviance (auto theft) or
confounding of
the old model.
The
new
model implies that
auto theft
is
lawful
and normative.
It
accommodates auto theft as
conformity to a
system of transport, and poses an alternative
to creating this normative
problem.
The
message: If you cannot fight auto theft, join
it
and make the force underlying auto theft
work for you.
Or: You cannot
stamp out
deviance, but perhaps you can include it
in
future plans.
It
is no accident that
engineers like
Streib and Wilkins are inclined to think this
way.
They
know that
you
cannot
beat
structural weakness into submission.
If too
much weight is put on a beam, a bridge will
collapse no matter how hard you beat on the
manufacturer of the beam. Better to redesign
the bridae. to allow for the tolerance to
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other components.
and
beams
stress of
Engineers are trained to redesign systems to
best-laid
the
accommodate deviance from
plans.
Consider

now

the

basic

structural

flaw

confronted
by
criminologists.
History
demonstrates that for periods not
exceeding
one generation,
political revolutions
like
that
in China
in
1949 can direct
law
enforcement
toward
corruption by officials
and by persons of wealth. But in the longer
run, our model of the crime problem produces
a consistent, persistent
problem
in
any
society with
chronic unemployment:
Young,
male
members
of
the
underclass--the
chronically unemployed
group--will
threaten
the breakdown
of law and order.
The more we
try to punish and
confine this
"dangerous
class," the worse the crime problem gets, and
the more people fear
to walk the streets of
their
communities. This model assumes that
crime is
inextricably linked
to poverty.
Either
poverty
itself causes crime,
or
something like bad genes
that cause crime
also cause poverty. Within the model,
then,
the poor
must
be
beaten,
cajoled
or
encouraged into submission
to societal norms
in order to free us from crime.
It is time to recognize that the model will
not work.
Its use will not free us from
crime, and
indeed its use dooms us to crime.
If we cannot succeed by fighting the poor, we
had better
join them to fight whatever it is
that keeps them poor and deviant.
Our new
model had better accommodate the poor,
and
assume that they are as normal as the rest of
us.
This indeed was the tenor of the work of
a
number
of
prominent
Depression-era
criminologists, such as
Robison
(1936),
Sellin
(1938),
Sutherland
(1940),
and
Tannenbaum
(1938).
But
we criminologists
largely fell back to our
old model
in
the
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wake of World War II, and
remain to this day.

here

most

of

us

Fortunately, criminologists at the fringes
as
known
(commonly
profession
of
the
"radical" or
"critical" criminologists) have
been laying the foundation for a new model of
Within the
crime that accommodates the poor.
model, crime and punishment are treated as an
power.
inherently political game--a game of
Those who have the greater power will be more
greater
inclined to victimize others, and
paying a
without
victimize
license to
penalty. Thus, it
is wealth
and the power
it,
not poverty, that is the
that goes with
crime.
There is a wealth of
chief cause of
corroborative evidence
for this proposition.
For
instance, doctors alone unlawfully
kill
and steal far more than all street criminals
combined
(see,
e.g.,
Sutherland,
1949;
Reiman, 1984;
Pepinsky and
Jesilow, 1985).
Even if
nine out of ten police officers were
assigned to patrol corporate and professional
suites instead of the streets,
(a) perhaps
more unlawful
harm would be detected and
curtailed than at
present, but
still,
(b)
rich offenders would be less likely than poor
to be caught
and
punished, since in most
cases, it is hard even
to detect that rich
offenders have victimized anyone.
By this model, wars on crime cannot be won
basically because they ignore
the heart of
the crime problem. They teach that might is
right.
They teach that poverty, or failure
to get
ahead by fair or
foul
means as
circumstances permit,
is a
sin.
Wars on
crime teach
people that naught but
a thin
blue line keeps
at
bay those who would take
their
television sets, their
money, their
paychecks,
their
dignity, their
health or
their very lives
for profit.
In a vicious
circle, they teach that
the Golden Rule is
naive--that the real world requires one to do
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unto others before they do unto oneself.
the babies of foreign
These wars emerge when
in
wars reach
adolescence,
or other civil
post-war economies where too much
money is
little
chasing too few goods
and
too
employment in a cycle we have come to call
"stagflation."
General
anxiety
that
livelihood and general support, respect
and
comfort are lacking
becomes focused
on a
tangible, relatively powerless scapegoat--the
poorest
of
the adolescent
men
in
the
society.
(Women in
these political cultures
more than
share the burden.
While
law
enforcement toys with the men in the streets,
women are charged with bearing and
raising
the next generation of
men and
of women to
tend their
homes.)
The force with
which
suppression of the unemployed is pursued,
to
the exclusion of employment of the citizenry,
only heightens popular insecurity.
Prison
populations swell
to record heights, which
serves only to fuel
the general
insecurity
and fear
of
crime.
This phenomenon
has
recurred for centuries (Melossi and Pavarini,
1981); today's Fourth American War
on
Crime
is
especially
violent
and
frightening
(Pepinsky and Jesilow, 1985).
Wars on crime are
one of
many forms that
failure to accommodate variety takes. During
these wars,
parents tend to hate and fear
spontaneity
in
their
children.
So while
prisons, training schools and death rows
are
set aside for young
men,
parents work to
create the atmosphere of
prisons in
their
homes (Pogrebin, 1983; Aries, 1962). For the
past century, and especially during
wars on
crime, concerted efforts have also been made
to keep children in schools for most of their
waking hours, where as
now, discipline
and
suppression
of youthful energy are stressed
over
inquiry
and
intellectual
growth
(Collins, 1979).
Intolerance
of
variety at
home
has
its
counterpart
in
foreign
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relations, where stronger nations
aim to
suppress weaker
peoples
(Tuchman, 1984).
Whatever the rhetoric
(as in
advocacy of
"socialism,"
.national
socialism,"
"free
markets,"
"liberalism,"
"conservatismin,"
"demand economies, " "supply-side economics,"
or "protectionism"), government intervenes on
the side of
preserving
the
power
and
prerogatives of
the wealthiest
and biggest
entrepreneurs,
rather
than
encouraging
reinvestment in new systems of production.
From the bedroom to the nursery to the
streets to the
schools to the workplace to
the boardrooms and halls of government,
the
norm is to try to hold
the line--to resist
deviation from established models of exchange
and instruction, notably by blaming the poor
and
the young for
threatening established
prerogatives of rich elders.
In this climate
of intolerance, lines are redrawn to cast
larger proportions of outliers as ungrateful,
irascible deviants. Or as Wilkins puts it,
deviance
is amplified, as determination not
to accommodate deviance grows.
What
would
accommodation
of
variety
entail?
Jesilow
(1982a;
1982b),
for
one
among today's criminologists, gets straignt
to the heart of the matter. He asks that we
look back to Beccaria (1968; originally 1764)
and Smith (1937;
originally 1776)
for key
insights.
Both
these
thinkers
were
preoccupied with
how
to
structure the
political
economy to promote the general
welfare. Both assumed that government needed
to be so structured as
to constrain the
citizenry
to be productive rather
than
destructive. Taken together,
they analyzed
the yin (Beccaria's deterrence of crime) and
yang (Smith's "invisible hand" promoting the
greatest good for the greatest number) of the
political
universe.
Read
the two works
carefully, and it becomes apparent that what
deterrence
requires
for
Beccaria
is
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for the
essentially what
Smith
requires
Each
thinker
to operate.
invisible hand
recognizes that destructive forces cannot be
government.
form of
blocked by the wrong
achieve peace
oligarchs cannot
Despots and
and
prosperity for
the general
public.
Beccaria notes that repressive punishment
does not deter crime. The public has to see
that
a captain
of industry who steals
a
million dollars
is as
likely to
lose
a
million-and-one dollars to the state as
a
mugger who steals ten dollars
is
to lose
$10.01.
Deterrence
requires
class-blind,
restrained punishment; otherwise,
punishment
becomes a spectacle that invites rather
than
discourages crime. But Beccaria glosses over
the hard question of
how
to make the state
class-blind.
Smith does not.
Smith recognizes that
no market
can be
free, nor justice evenhanded, when government
allows any economic enterprise to become too
large and free of personal control.
Instead,
the
governments
of
his
time
actually
intervened
to build oligopolies.
A
prime
intervention was
to
issue
charters of
incorporation.
These
charters
absolved
investors
(owners) from personal
liability
for the conduct of business affairs.
Thus,
investors could risk
joining
together
as
irresponsible strangers, and
the large pools
of
capital
that
resulted could dominate
markets with
no one
in
particular
being
responsible for the
conduct of
corporate
affairs.
Alternatively, where
incorporation
were precluded, each entrepreneur would have
to stake all personal assets on keeping the
business honest,
lawful and
responsive to
consumers. Even wealthy brothers would think
twice about trusting all
to a partnership
that
the partner might
betray, or
from
incurring too much
liability in
a single
enterprise.
So,
without this
government
intervention,
enterprises
would
be
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constrained
to
remain
small.
Each
entrepreneur would be loath to trust personal
wealth to strange suppliers
and customers,
and so markets would
tend
to be localized.
Meanwhile, there was
no reason
to expect
demand to be
any smaller in such a
free
market than it would be under
oligopolies,
and so in place of
small
numbers
of
large
producers, one would expect large numbers of
small producers. Given the stake in adapting
to market conditions that came with personal
liability of
entrepreneurs, and given that
small
enterprises
are more
manageable and
easier
to change than
large ones, small
enterprises would adapt to changing
markets
faster
than
large corporations.
Small
enterprises would be deterred from defrauding
or cheating customers; they could not afford
it, and local customers would
detect fraud
and dishonesty faster than strange, distant
customers. When the state tried to enforce
honest
compliance with contracts, when it
sought to punish white-collar criminals, the
relative powerlessness and
vulnerability of
relatively equal
small
enterprises would
facilitate
evenhanded
justice.
And since
entry into a
market of
small businesses is
easier
and cheaper than entry into a market
dominated by large corporations, those who
sought work could more easily create it for
themselves; the underclass would dwindle, and
with it crime and punishment.
Smith's utopia
was much like Marx's, where ownership of the
means of production was as widely spread as
possible among
the
general
populace.
It
coincides with
Schumacher's (1975) premise
that "small is beautiful,"
that the scale of
technology must
be kept
small
enough for
little groups of workers to afford it and to
shape it
to the forces of supply and demand.
Indeed, Smith's
initial
prototype of
the
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successful
enterprise
is a
needle factory
employing three workers.
To read Smith
carefully is to wonder whether he is turning
over in his grave at
how
economists like
Milton Friedman pervert his ideas.
Smith's
liberal
economy
is
designed
precisely
to accommodate variety. Within
a
free market, he aims to maximize the variety
of production systems, of worker methods
and
skills utilized, of
products themselves, and
of consumer preferences satisfied.
Where, as
here, variety is the norm, it becomes pretty
hard to isolate idiosyncratic producers and
consumers as deviant.
And
the
scale of
economic
dislocation and conflict
is
kept
small.
If a
typical three-person enterprise
in Podunk
goes under because it
loses its
market, that hardly presents the occasion for
a major police crackdown on the newly swelled
ranks of
the unemployed.
Because of
the
variety of
producers,
the failure of
one
scarcely entails the failure of many others.
Nor
will
this
be
the
occasion for
a
representative government to go to war,
as
when a threat
to Anaconda Copper and ATT
occasions our
government's complicity in a
military coup in a place like Chile. Since no
producer has the wealth
or power to do much
damage
even
by
determined
fraud
and
criminality, the state has no call to impose
heavy sanctions to
deter
crime.
Hence,
Smith's political
and
economic order
is
designed to permit
the state
to deter as
Beccaria advocates.
In sum, variety
in
the
substance
of
production
entails
peace,
deterrence, and relative justice.
As political
scientist Elinor
Ostrom has
urged upon
me, it is equally
important
to
recognize
that every variety
entails
a
corollary rigidity. This goes to the heart
of the seeming
paradox posed
by Streib and
Wilkins. The methods delineated by Beccaria
and Smith for achieving peace,
justice and
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general prosperity could hardly tighter.
Put
another
way,
when
Wilkins
calls
for
developing models to accommodate variety, he
is
advocating
logically
tight,
carefully
specified
models
for
achieving
the
objective. The need to specify a method for
encouraging personal variety
should be quite
familiar to us
in the U.S.; it is enshrined
in
our
Constitutional history.
Like Adam
Smith,
the framers of
our
Constitution
recognized that
unconstrained
government
invited despotism. But as Tocqueville (1945,
originally 1840: vol.
2, 336-39) recognized,
the American Constitution and the values it
represents invite a
kind
of
despotism,
in
which people concede political responsibility
to an
oligarchy of
state
and
economic
leaders, indeed the very
kind
of
oligarchy
that Adam Smith criticized.
So the question
remains: How can a government be constrained
to accommodate variety?
There
is nothing wrong
with what
our
Constitution
contains. The problem lies in
what
it
omits:
principles
of
government
investment.
As
Smith helps demonstrate,
governments like ours invest heavily
in the
economy;
even
the
most
conservative
government shapes the market by its
patterns
of investment.
Not only do state governments
ratify corporate charters. Some 30%
of
our
workforce
are
literally
government
employees. A quarter of our gross national
income is manifestly, directly expended by
the national government for defense.
Large
corporate enterprise is
subsidized via tax
law,
as
by
investment
credits
and
depreciation
allowances
which
favor
enterprises
with
the
largest
revenues.
Federal
Reserve
policies
are
designed
primarily to guard the profitability of
the
largest corporate banks, which in turn
favor
the
largest
corporate
and
national
borrowers.
So
to
argue
that
American
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investment
principled
governments engage in
advocate a change
to
in our economy is not
government
to
non-involvement
from
to argue that
instead
intervention; it is
One
principles of intervention be changed.
it
that
is
shortcoming of Smith's analysis
processes to be reversible;
assumes social
which
the analysis assumes that a government
has intervened in the economy can simply back
1859)
originally
(1968,
Darwin
out.
life
that
fact
basic
the
established
development to
embryonic
from
processes,
no
forward with
move
survival,
species
turning back (Bateson, 1980). We have reached
is
control
government
which
the stage at
Smith's
vital to moving the economy toward
If
governments were to withdraw
dreams.
subsidies from big business, such as defense
contracts, investment credits, depreciation
allowances and tax abatements, how would they
reinvest?
enterprise,
The constitution of a British
the Scott Bader Commonwealth as described by
provides sound
(1975:
274-92),
Schumacher
guidelines for investment:
the firm shall remain an
First,
size, so
limited
undertaking of
that every person in it can embrace
It
it in his mind and imagination.
not grow beyond 350 persons
shall
If
circumstances
or thereabouts.
appear to demand growth beyond this
limit, they shall be met by helping
fully independent
up new,
to set
units organised along the lines of
the Scott Bader Commonwealth.
work
Second, remuneration for
not
within the organisation shall
lowest paid
vary, as between the
ant the highest paid, irrespective
or
function
sex,
age,
of
range of 1:7,
experience, beyond a
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before tax.
Third,
as
the
members of
the
Commonwealth are partners and not
employees, they cannot be dismissed
by their co-partners for any reason
other
than
gross
personal
misconduct.
They can,
of
course,
leave voluntarily
at
any time,
giving due notice.
Fourth, the Board of Directors of
the firm,
Scott Bader
Co. Ltd.,
shall
be fully accountable to the
Commonwealth. Under
the rules laid
down
in
the
Constitution,
the
Commonwealth has the right and duty
to
confirm
or
withdraw
the
appointment of directors and also
to agree
to
remuneration.

their

levels

of

Fifth, not more than
forty per
cent of the net
profits of
Scott
Bader
Co.
Ltd.
shall
be
appropriated by the Commonwealth--a
minimum of
sixty per
cent
being
retained for
taxation
and
for
self-finance
[e.g.,
capital
investment] within
Scott Bader Co.
Ltd.--and the Commonwealth shall
devote one-half of the appropriated
profits
to the payment of
bonuses
to
those
working
within
the
operating company and
the other
half to charitable purposes outside
the Scott Bader organisation.
And finally, none of the products
of Scott Bader Co. Ltd.
shall
be
sold to customers who are known to
use them for war-related purposes.
Schumacher
manufacturer

goes
of

on
to report
sophisticated
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on
this
petroleum

distillates:
When
Mr. Ernest Bader and
his
colleagues
introduced
these
was
it
changes,
revolutionary
freely
predicted
that
a
firm
operating on this basis could not
In fact, it went
possibly survive.
from strength to strength, although
difficulties,
even
crises
and
setbacks, were by no means absent.
In the highly competitive setting
within which the firm is operating,
it
has, between
1951
and
1971,
increased its sales from 625,000 to
5 million pounds;
net profits have
grown from 72,000 to nearly 300,000
pounds a
year;
total
staff
has
increased from 161
to 379; bonuses
amounting
to over 150,000 pounds
(over the
twenty-year period) have
been distributed to the staff, and
an equal amount has been donated by
the
Commonwealth
to
charitable
purposes outside; and several
new
firms have been set up.

(Schumacher, 1975:

276-77)

In an American context, where the scale of
production has grown bigger than in Britain,
we might have to accommodate the difference
by encouraging
the development
of
larger
enterprises than Scott Bader. This
would be
especially so in using abandoned plants
like
steel
or
auto assembly factories.
Here,
where several
thousand
workers might be
needed to use existing capital, we need not
require that the plant
stay
closed
because
its workforce would so far exceed Scott Bader
limits.
Otherwise, the Scott Bader model
ought to be as appropriate to American as to
British circumstance.
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Note that
Scott
Bader
does
not seek to
revert to pre-corporate times; it uses
laws
of
incorporation
and shapes them to a new
purpose--to provide guarantees to its workers
and to its community.
Its constitution sets
minimal,
basic
restrictions
on
size,
ownership,
management
and
purpose of the
enterprise.
I suggest
that
Smith
and Beccaria's
objectives might be approached if governments
were to limit their investment to businesses
that constituted themselves like the Scott
Bader
Commonwealth.
There
need
be few
restrictions on
corporate purpose. Would-be
entrepreneurs ought instead to be encouraged
to invent all manner of products and services
to meet local needs. For services like those
of law and medicine, subsidies could take the
form of special government insurance coverage
of clients.
Indeed, the enterprise of this
kind that
provided
the
lowest-cost service
could be used as the standard by which limits
on
insurance
coverage were
set.
The
government could
also reserve consulting
services--for
problems
of
management,
marketing, training
and accounting--for such
enterprises.
Thus constrained,
government
investment
would
foster variety
in production
and
It
would encourage enterprises
consumption.
themselves to long-term planning
to commit
While the variance
and to community welfare.
consumer
in
services, and
in products and
preferences, within and among markets, should
the model works as projected,
be increased if
should
of method
indices
in
the variance
are
method
of
indices
such
Two
narrow.
employment
(level
and
average
length of
regular
decline as
should
unemployment
employment becomes
the
norm) and
income
corporations and among
disparity (both among
individuals, which
should
also decline).
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Variance in cost of living over time should
favored
that
model
a
under
also decline,
short-term
over
investment
long-term
Because the failure of any
profit-taking.
economic
minimal
enterprise would cause
into the
re-entry
because
and
dislocation,
market for displaced workers would be eased,
bail-outs like those of Chrysler would not be
businesses
worked,
the model
If
needed.
their
toward
would be rewarded for honesty
workers, suppliers and customers, and so
the
of
white-collar
major crime problem--that
crime--should decline. The underclass should
punishment
shrink, and so reported crime and
should also decline.
As the variance
in
income among
citizens declined, so,
too,
should severity and disparity
of
criminal
justice sanctions.
In
sum,
the model
predicts that economic forces would combine
to diminish and accommodate deviance rather
than amplifying it.
(This is essentially a
summary of the argument
laid out in Pepinsky
and Jesilow, 1985.)

CONCLUSION
Social control and social engineering need
not restrict human opportunity.
Properly
modeled,
they
can
increase
and
vary
opportunity, and
in
the process, reduce
levels of injustice, crime, and war.
Since World War II, timidity has dominated
American criminology. This is only natural
for criminologists who had
been confronted
with bold, broad and penetrating critiques by
were
who
but
Depression-era colleagues,
models of
unwilling to forsake traditional
criminologists
Until
crime and punishment.
is
poverty
that
premise
the
abandon
crime
unavoidably linked to crime, and that
by restricting
controlled
be
can only
underclass
most characteristic of
behavior
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young men, ours is bound to be a
science of
intolerance. We are bound to assume that
crime is
a
departure
from
middleor
upper-class values, and to limit
solutions to
the problem
to strategies for
restricting
variance
from success within the dominant
political and economic system.
If,
then,
traditional
criminology produces
practical knowledge of crime and its
control,
it
must by definition
aid
repression and
restriction
of
forms
of
human
endeavor.
Consciously or
unconsciously,
I think this
reality
is recognized by all
of
today's
criminologists. At the same time, many of us
are committed
to
empowering and helping
rather than hurting and restricting those we
study.
Within
the traditional
model,
our
good will
drives us to restrict the scope of
our science, as
to problems of "the middle
range," and to what
we assert are apolitical
or value-neutral questions
(Pepinsky, 1980:
190-93).
Indeed,
as
I have heard many a
colleague argue, it
is dangerous to
do
grander work within
traditional models. But
middle-range,
value-neutral
work is
no
solution to the problem.
In the
aggregate,
such works perpetuate,
legitimize and foster
the growth of repressive crime control.
It
is the models themselves that turn good-faith
efforts to bad ends.
Above all,
criminology is the
study of
human intolerance.
We study how criminals
fail to tolerate what
is
precious to their
victims, and how victims and would-be allies
fail to tolerate offenders.
The corollary is
that crime and
punishment
decline only as
tolerance of people, and
of their control of
their
own destiny, increases--where people
choose not to restrict
others'
exercise of
freedom to be
and
do
differently
by
victimizing or
punishing them for deviance
from their
own
life patterns.
Very few
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criminologists
(Christie, 1981,
being one
outstanding exception) even try to find what
makes tolerance
possible.
If
the models
change,
insofar
as
criminologists become
scientists of human tolerance, they can
in
good conscience become avowedly and
grandly
political in building and testing theories of
crime and
its control.
We have a strong
classical tradition to build this effort upon
in works of scholars like Cesare Beccaria and
Adam
Smith.
We have in
fact a
highly
developed body of
empirically
based and
tested theory from which to proceed, once it
is recognized that the work of scholars like
Adam Smith and E.
F.
Schumacher belongs in
our field.
As here, paradigm shift is never
easy not
because the
new
paradigm
is
unproven, but because of
the political
and
psychological investment all scientists tend
to have in
asking
traditional
questions
(Kuhn,
1974).
There is
a way
for
the
criminological community to build
knowledge
that enables Americans and
others to free
themselves from crime.
Whether there is a
will remains to be seen.
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